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Rothken: Punitive Damages

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades commercial arbitration has enjoyed
steady growth as an informal alternative to civil litigation. 1 The
growth stems from the speed and cost efficiency of arbitration in
contrast to civil litigation. 2 Arbitration is also strongly favored
by the courts to serve the important public policy of reducing
the burden on the judiciary.3 In the last decade, federal and
state courts have looked to this policy to permit an arbitrator to
punish wrongdoers with punitive damages."
This comment theorizes that awarding punitive damages in
commercial arbitration is "state action"6 requiring due process. 6
Unlike the traditional contract remedy of compensatory dam1. R. COULSON. BUSINESS ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 8-9 (3d ed. 1986)
(Commercial arbitration has increased by 250% since 1972).
2. See Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 438 (1988).
3. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) ("One thing an appellate judge
learns very quickly is that a large part of all litigation in the courts is an exercise in
futility and frustration. The anomaly is that there are better ways of resolving disputes,
and we must in the public interest move toward taking a large volume of private conflicts
out of the courts and into the channels of arbitration.").
4. See Raytheon Company v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988); Singer v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Peabody v. Rotan Mosie, Inc., 677
F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559
(D.S.D. 1987); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726
(1985); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima, Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 360 (N.D.
Ala. 1984), aft'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 569
F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D. N.C. 1983).
5. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) ("[TJhe commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those acting
under color of its authority.").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states "[nJo State shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
the law."
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ages,' punitive damages have for centuries been under the exclusive control of the State.8 The Supreme Court has found that a
traditional and exclusive State power exercised by a private individual is "state action" requiring due process. 9 Therefore when
punitive damages are at issue, the arbitration agreement must
consist of a minimum quantum of procedures that balance the
protection against erroneous punishment with the State's interest in limiting the burden on arbitration. 10
This comment also theorizes that punitive damages violate
due process by giving the arbitrator unfettered discretion in determining punitive damages awards. Unlike the traditional contract remedy of compensatory damages that are calculated based
on the amount of harm done,tl punitive damages are designed to
punish and deter wrongful behavior.12 Punitive damages vastly
exceed the amount of harm done and have no objective limits. 13
In describing punitive damages awards inflicted by juries, Justice Rehnquist mentioned "[p]unitive damages are frequently
based on the caprice and prejudice of jurors."14 Justice Marshall
described punitive damages as "allow[ing] juries to penalize
heavily the unorthodox and the unpopular and exact little from
others."ui And most recently in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip 18 the Supreme Court declared "[o]ne must concede that
unlimited jury discretion or unlimited judicial discretion for that
matter, in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities."n Unlike jury trials, the arbitrator is not required to use the correct punitive
damages standard. The arbitrator is also not required to issue a
7. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854).
8. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976).
9. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
11. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854).
12. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (Punitive damages "are not
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.").
13. Id.
14. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 83 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
16. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157 (1991).
17. Id. at 4161.
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written OpinIOn, therefore judicial review is usually foreclosed.
Thus, unfettered arbitrator discretion violates procedural due
process. IS
This comment will begin by discussing the statutory background of commercial arbitration and the limited judicial review
of arbitration awards. It will then discuss the evolution of punitive damages in commercial arbitration. This comment will then
show that punitive damages are "state action" requiring procedural due process. Finally, it will then use the Mathews u. Eldridge I9 calculus created by the Supreme Court and the Haslip
case to show that a written opinion and enhanced judicial review
are needed to satisfy procedural due process when punitive damages are awarded in arbitration.
II.

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION BACKGROUND

A.

ARBITRATION DEFINED

Commercial arbitration is an informal dispute resolution
mechanism created by contract. In the arbitration contract the
parties choose a private person to hear their dispute and to resolve it by rendering a binding decision. 20
The scope of the arbitration agreement determines the remedial options that are available to the arbitrator. The scope is
usually found in a clause that refers to the rules of an arbitration organization. For example, if the clause refers to the rules of
the American Arbitration Association (AAA),21 then the scope
will be "any remedy or relief which is just and equitable and
18. Although due process can be waived when there is clear and compelling evidence
of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, See D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174 (1972), a 'broad' arbitration clause does not rise to the Overmeyer standard,
especially in light of the Supreme Court's declaration "indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and. . .not to presume acquiesance in the loss of such rights." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
19. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
20. KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CASES AND MATERIALS 304 (1986).
21. The American Arbitration Association's suggested clause: "Any controversy or
claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator{s) may be
entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof."
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within the terms of the agreement of the parties. "22

B.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

The arbitration agreement is enforced by statute. The most
important statute in this area is the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA).23 The FAA was established in 1925 as a body of federal
substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an
arbitration agreement. 24
The FAA overcomes judicial hostility inherited from England in enforcing arbitration contracts. 211 According to Congress
"[t]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . .This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by
the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent
was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative
enactment. . . "26
The FAA is based on the federal commerce power and
makes a written contract to arbitrate "in any... contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce ... valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."27 Therefore
the FAA becomes applicable when there is a written agreement
to arbitrate and the contract containing the arbitration agreement evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce.
22. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION § 43 (1990),
23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
24. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24
(1983) (The FAA created "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable
to any arbitration agreement" within its power.).
25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (quoting H. R. Rep No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924)).
26.ld.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See, e.g., Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 401
(1966) (A written arbitration agreement was enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Prima Paint serviced 175 clients in numerous states and obtained the consulting services
of Flood & Conklin to assist in the transfer of sales and manufacturing operations from
New Jersey to Maryland. The Court held the Federal Arbitration Act applicable under §
2. Justice Fortas wrote "There could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a
transaction in interstate commerce.").
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The drafters of the FAA were motivated by the important
advantages of arbitration. First, arbitration of contract disputes
saves time and money in contrast to litigation. 28 Second, an arbitrator has special expertise to decide contract questions. 29 Third,
arbitration reduces the burden on the judiciary. 30 As a result of
these advantages, the Supreme Court has declared a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 31

C.

LIMITED JUDICIAL REVIEW

The strong policy favoring arbitration has resulted in the
insulation of arbitration awards by the judiciary. For example,
in Wilko v. Swan 32 the Supreme Court created the "manifest
disregard" doctrine. 33 This doctrine is an extension of the limited basis for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA.34
28. Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 269
(1926).
29. [d.

30. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) (According to the House of
Representatives the FAA was needed "at this time when there is so much agitation
against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable.").
31. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24
(1983).
32. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
33. [d. at 436-437.
34. 9 U.S.C.A. §10 (West 1970). The Federal Arbitration Act provides for a modification or correction of an award under the following circumstances:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof, and
promote justice between the parties.
The Federal Arbitration Act states that an award may be vacated under the following
circumstances:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exeuted them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by
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The doctrine dictates that an arbitration award is vacated when
an arbitrator understood and correctly stated, yet completely ignored the law. 311 The standard goes beyond mere error in the law
or failure of the arbitrator to understand or apply the law. 36 The
court cannot vacate an arbitration award just because of an "arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of laws
urged upon it."37
In many instances, an arbitration award is further insulated
by a lack of a transcript or written opinion. The policy of the
AAA is to insure finality by putting pressure on its arbitrators
not to write opinions but to merely state the award in dollar
amounts. S8
In Wilko, the Supreme Court legitimized the policy of the
AAA by declaring an arbitration award "may be made without
explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of
their proceedings. "39 The Court reaffirmed this position in Bernhardt u. Polygraphic CO.40 stating arbitrators "need not give
their reasons for their results."4! A federal court justified the insulation of arbitration awards in Sobel u. Hertz Warner & CO.:42
[A] requirement that arbitrators explain their
reasoning in every case would help to uncover
egregious failures to apply the law to an arbitrated dispute. But such a rule would undermine
the very purpose of arbitration, which is to provide a relatively quick, efficient, and informal
means of private dispute settlement. 43

Therefore, the courts have found finality is more important
than accuracy in preserving the usefulness of arbitration.
the arbitrators.
35. Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs International Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582
(2d Cir. 1967).
36.Id.
37. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d
Cir. 1986).
38. See Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 439 (1988).
39. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).
40. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
41. Id. at 203.
42. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
43. Id. at 1214.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/6

6

Rothken: Punitive Damages

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

1991]

D.

393

LEGISLATIVE INTENT ON THE SCOPE OF ARBITRABLE ISSUES

Implicit in the insulation of an arbitration award from judicial review is that the scope of arbitrable issues is limited to ordinary contract disputes. The legislative intent is evident in an
article 44 written by an FAA drafter:
Not all questions arising out of contracts ought to
be arbitrated. It is a remedy peculiarly suited to
the disposition of the ordinary disputes between
merchants as to questions of fact- quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of
payment, excuses for non-performance, and the
like. It has a place also in the determination of
the simpler questions of law- the questions of law
which arise out of these daily relations between
merchants as to passage of title, the existence of
warranties, or the questions of law which are complementary to the questions of fact which we have
just mentioned. It is not the proper method for
deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions or policy in the
application of statutes. 4G

Traditionally, ordinary contract disputes consisted of "make
whole" remedies such as compensatory damages. 46 Punitive
damages were prohibited. 47 The recent introduction of punitive
damages into contract disputes 48 created a problem for the
courts: In light of the informal procedures and limited judicial
review consistent with the arbitration of "ordinary contract disputes," does an arbitrator have the power to punish a party to a
contract with punitive damages?

44.
(1926).
45.
46.
47.

Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.

REV.

265, 281

[d.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 589 (3rd ed. 1987).
[d.
48. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752
(1984).
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
A. GARRITY PROHIBITS PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION

In the landmark case of Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,,,e the
New York Court of Appeals found punitive damages in commercial arbitration violate public policy.IIO The court, after finding
punitive damages to be non-compensatory and therefore a coercive sanction,1I1 based its holding on two factors. First, the use of
coercive force is under the exclusive control of the State. 1I2 Second, arbitration awards are not vacated upon an error in law or
fact and therefore "amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial
power."113 The Garrity court concluded "[t]he freedom to contract does not embrace the freedom to punish, even by
contract. "114
The Garrity court used public policy to balance the weight
of promoting arbitration of disputes with the weight of limited
judicial review of punitive damage awards. In Garrity the balance weighed in favor of the limited judicial review resulting in
the prohibition of punitive damages. Other courts, however,
have balanced the public policy scale differently.

B. THE SUPREME COURT EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF ARBITRABLE
ISSUES
Since Garrity, the Supreme Court, without considering the
issue of punitive damages, has used the strong policy favoring
arbitration to expand the scope of arbitrable issues. In Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.1I11 the
Supreme Court found that courts must broadly construe the
scope of an arbitration agreement in favor of the arbitrator's
49. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354 (1976).
50. [d. at 355. See also Fahnstock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 Civ. 1792 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoes., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (N.M. 1985).
51. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 355 (1976).
52. [d. at 358.
53. [d.
54. [d.
55. Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1982).
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power. G6
For example in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc. the Supreme Court, following its own precedent in Moses
H. Cone, permitted the arbitration of a treble damages antitrust claim. GB In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon/,e after citing Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court permitted the arbitration of a treble damages RICO claim. 60
G7

In both Mitsubishi and McMahon the Supreme Court was
careful to note that the treble damages were primarily compensatory.61 The Supreme Court was therefore speaking to the arbitration of non-punitive claims when they declared "[t]he streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential
restriction on substantive rights. "62
C.

THE COURTS PERMIT PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ARBITRATION

Most federal and state courts considering the issue of punitive damages in arbitration have cited the strong policy favoring
arbitration and then proceeded to permit the arbitrator to award
punitive damages. B3 Unlike Garrity, these courts have found the
56. [d. at 24-25 (The strong federal policy favoring arbitration was articulated: "The
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ... " The Court also
mentioned that "under the Federal Arbitration Act. . .arbitration clauses should be read
broadly and arbitration should not be denied in the absence of clear and express
exclusions.").
57. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
58. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
59. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
60. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
61. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (The treble damages "seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain
compensation for that injury."); Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
240 (1987) ( "The legislative history of § 1964 (c) reveals the same [as Mitsubishi trebledamages) emphasis on the remedial role of the treble-damages provision.").
62. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
63. See Raytheon Company v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st
Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988); Singer v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Peabody v. Rotan MosIe, Inc., 677
F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559
(D.S.D. 1987); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726
(1985); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima, Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 360 (N.D.
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public policy balance weighs in favor of promoting arbitration by
including a broad range of remedies.
For example, in Willis v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.,s. the federal court after looking to the Supreme Court principle articulated in Moses H. Cone, that "any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,"811 found punitive damages were included in the broad
arbitration agreement. 88 The Willis court did not find any "public policy reason persuasive enough to justify prohibiting arbitrators from resolving issues of punitive damages submitted by
parties."87
The court in Willoughby Roofing & Supply v. Kajima International 88 agreed with the Willis court. The Willoughby
court reasoned that arbitration can only be viable if it can handle all the disputes that arise under the agreement. The Willoughby court concluded "[t]o deny arbitrators the full range of
remedial tools generally available under the law would be to
hamstring arbitrators and to lessen the value and efficiency of
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution."89
Unlike Garrity, the Willoughby court found the public policy of
promoting arbitration, by including a full range of remedies, outweighed the limited judicial review of punitive damages awards.

Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, 569
F. Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.N.C. 1983). But see Fahnstock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 Civ.
1792 (S.D.N. Y. 1990); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. DeFluiter, 456 N.E.2d
429 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (N.M.
1985).
64. Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F.Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C.1983).
65. [d. at 823 (citing Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1982».
.
66. [d. at 823.
67. [d. at 824.
68. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima, 598 F.Supp 353 (N.D.Ala
1984). See also Raytheon Company v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6
(1989) ("Where such conduct could give rise to punitive damages if proved to a court,
there is no compelling reason to prohibit a party which proves the same conduct to 8
panel of arbitrators from recovering the same damages.").
69. [d. at 362.
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IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IS "STATE
ACTION" REQUIRING DUE PROCESS
There must be "state action"70 for the due process clause 71
to be invoked. Although an arbitrator is considered to be a private party, "state action" exists when private conduct involves
the exercise of power that was "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."72 In Flagg Bros. Inc. u. Brooks the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that although "many
functions have been traditionally performed by governments,
very few have been exclusively reserved to the state. "73
An arbitrator awarding punitive damages is a good example
of a private party exercising traditional and exclusive State
power.
Garrity supports this view. The public policy concerns in
Garrity were based on a private arbitrator using a traditional
and exclusive State power in the form of punitive damages:
[If an arbitrator was to award punitive damages]
a tradition of the rule of law in organized society
is violated. One purpose of the rule of law is to
require that the use of coercion be controlled by
the State. In a highly developed commercial and
economic society the use of private force is not
the danger, but the uncontrolled use of coercive
economic sanctions in private arrangements. For
centuries the power to punish has been a monopoly of the State, and not that of any private individual. The day is long past since barbaric man
achieved redress by private punitive measures.'·
70. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) ("[T]he commands of
the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those acting under
color of its authority. ").
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 states "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
the law."
72. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
73. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
74. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 359 (1976).
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An arbitrator awarding punitive damages can be understood
only by State delegation of this traditional and exclusive power.
This can be seen in the distinction between an arbitrator awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages. Compensatory damages are a result of the interaction between autonomous
parties'. Claims based on personal interaction can be removed
from judicial administration. 711
Punitive damages, on the other hand, use the breaching
party's liability as a means of achieving the extrinsic social goal
of punishment and deterrence. 76 Punitive damages can be seen
as having been grafted onto the contractual relationship by the
State. 77 The parties to an arbitration agreement "have no power
to structure, even indirectly, an autonomous resolution to an issue whose contours. . .go distinctly beyond their own interactions. "78 Punitive damages must therefore be imposed from
without, by the State, as it is not within the domain of the parties direct interchange. 79
Therefore, the removal of punitive damages from the judiciary into a private arbitral forum can only be explained and permitted by State conferra1. 8o "Absent legislative conferral of [punitive damages] authority on some other [forum], removal of the
distributive power from the judiciary is inconceivable as, say, an
attempt to establish the private assessment and collection of
tax."81
The courts by enforcing an arbitration award of punitive
damages remove the traditional State monopoly on the use of
punitive damages. The arbitrator's use of this traditional and
exclusive State power constitutes "state action" invoking the
due process clause.
75. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1075 (1987).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979). See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973) (Punitive damages are not compensation for injury.
"Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and
to deter its future occurrence.").
77. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1080 (1987).
78. Id. at 1081.
79. Id. at 1075.

80.Id.
81. Id.
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MATHEWS CALCULUS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES IN

ARBITRATION

In Mathews v. Eldridge 82 the Supreme Court created a balancing test for determining the constitutional adequacy of a particular set of procedures. The following factors are weighed:
First, the private interest that will be impacted by the official
action. 8S Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private
interest through the procedures used and the probable value of
enhanced procedural safeguards. 84 Third, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the enhanced procedural requirement
would entail. 86
1.

The Private Interest at Stake is Enormous

The property and liberty interests at stake are enormous.
The property interest in the form of a monetary penalty has no
limit. Unlike compensatory damages tliat correlate with the
harm done, punitive damages are based on highly discretionary
standards of punishment and deterrence. 86 As a result, the arbitrator can bankrupt a party.87
A liberty interest is involved since punitive damages can
harm reputation. 88 Punitive damages have been described as
quasi-criminal,89 and some commentators have even proposed
82. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
83. Id. at 335.
84.Id.
85.Id.
86. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973) (In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that
they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused."); Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) ("[T]his grant of wholly standard less discretion to determine the severity of when, where, or how much, violates fundamental due
process.").
87. See generally Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157, 4171
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A] jury would not exceed its discretion under [Alabama] state law by imposing an award of punitive damages that was deliberately calculated to bankrupt the defendant.").
88. Wisconsin v. Constantine au, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
89. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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applying criminal safeguards to punitive damages cases. 90 The
serious potential punishment from punitive damages requires a
high degree of precision by the arbitrator in his determination. 91
2.

There is a High Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

In contrast to the high degree of precision required in the
determination of punitive damages, there is practically no protection against erroneous deprivation from an arbitration award
of punitive damages. At best an arbitrator is given unfettered
freedom to choose a penalty under inherently vague punitive
damage laws. At worst an arbitrator can ignore the law completely, and given the lack of written opinion and judicial review, he can act as a super-legislator, rendering punitive awards
based on his own value system rather than society's.
The Garrity court, in support of its finding that arbitral
awards of punitive damages violate public policy, pointed to inadequate judicial review as a critical factor:
The trouble with an arbitration admitting a
power to grant unlimited damages by way of punishment is that if the court treated such an award
in the way arbitration awards are usually treated,
and followed the award to the letter, it would
amount to an unlimited draft upon judicial
power. In the usual case, the court stops only to
inquire if the award is authorized by the contract;
is complete and final on its face; and if the proceeding was fairly conducted. 92
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. u. Burke,93
Judge Legge was concerned by a punitive damages award that
was unaccompanied by an arbitrator opinion and thereby foreclosed judicial review. After following the precedent permitting
arbitrators to render awards without a written opinion Judge
Legge commented:
90. See, e.g., Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983).
91. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
92. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (1976) (quoting Matter of Pub·
lishers' Association of N.Y. City, 280 A:pp.Div. 500, 503 (1952».
93. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Burke, 741 F.Supp 191 (N.D. Cal
1990).
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Indeed, some thought about the future of this
type of arbitration appears to be necessary. If industry arbitration, such as this within the investment industry, is to become a substitute for civil
litigation...then the arbitrators and counsel
must be aware of the necessity for giving a federal
court some record for review that is more than
just a statement of the amount of the award. This
court does not suggest that arbitrators be obliged
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law
equivalent to those required of a trial court. But
the mere granting of a monetary award, without
more, combined with the limited power of a federal court to review it, creates both uncertainty
and secrecy which is undesirable as an alternative
dispute resolution. s•

3. The High Risk
Remedied

of Erroneous Deprivation

tS

Easily

The uncertainty and secrecy of a punitive damages award in
arbitration can be easily remedied. The arbitrator can use the
State standard for punitive damages and then write a brief opinion justifying the punitive damages award. This will permit judicial review. The judiciary can then look at the size of award, and
in light of the arbitral opinion, determine if the award exceeds
the amount needed to punish and deter the unacceptable
behavior.
Although the case dealt with juries instead of arbitrators,
the Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip 95
placed particular emphasis on the need for judicial review of punitive damages awards. In Has lip , after commenting that unfettered jury discretion in determining punitive damages invites
"extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities,"96 the
Supreme Court found appropriate jury instructions in combination with heightened judicial review passed the constitutional
challenge. 97
94. Id. at 195.
95. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157 (1991).
96. Id. at 4161.
97. Id. at 4162.
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The Court found three factors to be important. First, the
jury instructions were confined to the State policy of punishment and deterrence. 98 Second, the trial court had to give reasons in the record for refusing to lower a jury verdict. 99 Third,
there was substantial judicial review using detailed standards to
make sure that a punitive damages award does "not exceed an
amount that will accomplish society's goals of punishment and
deterrence. "100

These same standards will be useful in the arbitration of
punitive damages. An arbitrator, like the Haslip jury, must use
the State standard for punitive damages. This will limit arbitrator discretion to the specific punitive damages standard in the
jurisdiction.
An arbitrator, similar to the Haslip trial court, must issue
written reasons to justify the punitive damages award. This will
permit judicial review. The written reasons will also for~e the
arbitrator to reflect on his decision and therefore result in a
more accurate punitive damages award. 101 Additionally, written
reasons will serve the policy of punishment and deterrence by
enabling the wrongdoer to learn with specificity the unacceptable conduct. 102
The judiciary, as in Haslip, can then use the arbitrator's
opinion to determine if the punitive damages award is consistent
with the State policy of punishment and deterrence. The judiciary will be able to compare punitive damages awards from arbitrators and juries to insure the consistency of all punitive damages awards.

98.Id.
99.Id.
100. Id.
101. See Scauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 580 (1987).
102. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 713, 761 (2nd ed. 1988)
(describing the "right not to be singled out for hurtful treatment by the state without a
chance to talk back. and to be told why").
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4. The Additional Procedures of the Correct Punitive Standard, a Written Opinion, and Judicial Review are a Small Burden on Arbitration
The three added procedures-requiring the correct punitive
damages standard, a written arbitral opinion, and judicial review, are a small burden on arbitration compared to the added
accuracy they bring to the decisionmaking process. First, the requirement of following the correct punitive standard is a very
small burden considering that arbitrators already must follow
"some" standard in their decision. Second, the written opinion is
a small burden since it is only required in the few instances
when punitive damages are awarded. Third, although judicial review impacts on the arbitral policy of reducing the burden on
the judiciary, judicial review is not mandatory and the review
process is quite brief compared to the burden caused by a jury
trial determination of punitive damages. Therefore, the burden
on the arbitration process is outweighed by the greatly enhanced
accuracy of punitive damages awards.

5. The State has no Legitimate Interest in a Speedy and Cost
Efficient Arbitration that Results in Arbitrary Punishment
The State has no legitimate interest in a speedy and cost
efficient arbitration process that results in erroneous penalties.
"It is anomalous, and counter to deep-rooted legal principles
and common-sense notions, to punish persons who meant no
harm ..... "103 A written opinion and the subsequent possibility
of meaningful judicial review will permit an arbitrator to award
a "full range of remedies"104 and therefore provide the best balance between maintaining the efficacy of commercial arbitration
and protecting against erroneous punitive awards.
V.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism created by
contract and as such can effectuate the intent of the parties. Pu103. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 87·88 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima, 598 F.Supp 353, 362 (N.D.
Ala 1984).
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nitive damages are a creation of the State and serve the distributive purpose of punishment and deterrance by supercompensating the injured party. When courts permit arbitrators to
award punitive damages, they take the traditional and exclusive
coercive power of the State and enforce a determination by a
private arbitrator. The private use of punitive damages therefore
constitutes "state action" and triggers due process protection
against arbitrary government action.
An arbitration award of punitive damages violates due process by giving the arbitrator unacceptable discretion. There are
virtually no safeguards to protect against an arbitrator making a
mistake. An arbitration award will not be disturbed unless there
was a "manifest disregard" of the law. Due to the lack of a written opinion, judicial review is usually foreclosed.
The Mathews calculus balances the weight of the procedures needed to prevent erroneous deprivation against the
weight of preserving the finality and efficacy of arbitration. The
balance dictates that the Haslip factors must be followed. An
arbitrator· must use the correct punitive damages standard, and
an award of punitive damages must be accompanied by a written
opinion. Judicial review will then be available to use objective
criteria to insure the punitive damages award does not exceed
the amount needed to punish and deter wrongdoers. The burden
of these added procedures on arbitration is small in light of the
increased accuracy of punitive damages awards. Thus, the Willoughby policy of promoting arbitration by making available a
"full range of remedial tools,"lOI! and the Garrity policy of
prohibiting an "unlimited draft upon judicial power,"106 are
reconciled.
Ira P. Rothken*

105. [d.

106. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 358 (1976) (quoting Matter of Publishers' Association of N.Y. City, 280 App.Div. 500, 503 (1952)).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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